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Abstract 
Most previous literatures deem ownership structure as exogenous variables to deal with and believe there only exists 
a static relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. In this paper, we choose China’s 509 
listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen during 1999-2008.  With dynamic panel model, after controlling effect of 
past performance, simultaneity, as well as unobservable heterogeneity, we come to the following conclusions: (1) 
There is a two-way interaction effect between the proportion of largest shareholding and corporate performance; 
(2)Whether in a static or dynamic model, the proportion of management ownership is uncorrelated with performance; 
(3)Some weak evidence shows there exists intertemporal effect between ownership structure and corporate 
performance. However, the relationship is not stable, which depends on the definition of performance and the choice 
of estimation methods. 
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1. Introduction  
 For ownership structure and corporate performance, the earliest research dates back to Berle & Means 
(1932). In their classic work "Modern Corporation and Private Property", they believe that the most 
significant feature of modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control right. To ease the 
efficiency loss arising from the separation of ownership, the principal need to supervise and motivate the 
agent. In this case, ownership structure may exert impact on corporate performance. This is the research 
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prototype of ownership structure and corporate performance. However, Berle & Means don’t move on. 
Later, Jensen & Meckling (1976) further group shareholders into internal and outside shareholders. They 
argue the rising of internal shareholders with control right can effectively stimulate management, reduce 
agency costs and improve corporate performance. Nowadays, the conclusion seems  still imperfect, but as 
pioneers, the research of Jensen & Meckling along with Berle & Means provides important theoretical 
guidance and empirical evidence for recent research. In addition, basing on different perspective and 
research methods, researchers draw various conclusions. For reasons, besides the choice difference of 
performance variable, existing literatures often regard ownership structure as exogenous variable to deal 
with. According to Demsetz &Villalonga(2001), ownership structure is endogenous. Thus, early research 
results are questionable. It is as said by HHP (1999), "managerial ownership and firm performance are 
endogenously decided by business contract environment, the negligence of endogeneity will inevitably 
lead to the bias of estimation." In addition, more and more research also shows that the relationship 
between ownership and performance is both static and dynamic (Fahlenbrach&Stulz, 2009). For the 
subject, although some scholars start to gradually pay attention to, but few of them take China’s listed 
companies for example in research at present. In this paper, we will do pioneering exploration. 
2. Research Design 
2.1. Research Hypotheses 
When exploring endogenous relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance, 
foreign scholars often believe there are three possibilities: One perspective is independent theory; Another 
is reverse causality; The third is interaction hypothesis (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos & 
Lazaretou, 2007; Wintoki et al., 2010). Most Chinese scholars support the latter two views. For example, 
Zhang Zongyi and Song Zengji(2003) draw on methods of Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), finding 
ownership structure is an endogenous variable and doesn’t affect corporate performance. Wei Feng and 
Kong Yu(2006) also hold the same opinion. Wang Hua and Huang Zijun(2006) argue ownership and 
corporate performance should influence each other under the endogenous framework. 
In addition, there is a time lapse to get information in an imperfect market. Changes of current 
ownership structure are often understood by only part of investors, which may make impact of ownership 
structure extend to the next or longer period of performance. Similarly, sluggish publication regimen also 
fails to make the fluctuation of performance keep pace with the change of ownership. Therefore, when 
investors make investment, they may judge in terms of current corporate performance rather than actual 
situation. In fact, there may be an intertemporal effect between ownership structure and performance. For 
example, Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2009) confirm the former ownership structure will affect latter 
performance. In addition, the research of Davidson & Rowe (2004) also provides the evidence of reverse 
causality. According to these, we make the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Under analysis framework of endogeneity, ownership structure is affected by corporate 
performance or affects with performance each other. 
Hypothesis 2: Under analysis framework of dynamic endogeneity, there are intertemporal effect 
between ownership structure and performance. 
2.2. Empirical Model Specification 
According to hypotheses, we set the following empirical model: 
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 Here, ity and itx  respectively means corporate performance and ownership structure, 1itz  represents 
control variables such as company size, asset-liability ratio, business risk, the property of largest 
shareholders, R & D and annual, industry and other dummy variables. 2itz  represents control variables of 
ownership structure, including company size, asset-liability ratio, business growth, business risk, the 
property of largest shareholders and annual dummy variables.  
2.3. Variable Definition 
The definition of variables is as followed: 
Table 1 Definition of Relevant Variables 
Variable Definition 
CR1 Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder 
MH Percentage of shares owned by management 
ROA Return on assets 
GROWTH Growth rate of total assets 
LNA Nature logarithm of year-end total assets 
SE Standard deviation of monthly return on individual stocks without considering the reinvested rate of cash dividends  
DBR Asset-liability ratio 
TOP1 One if the largest shareholder is state-owned shares or state-owned legal person shares; zero otherwise 
RD Ratio of research and development expenditures to total sales 
2.4. Data Sources 
     Data mainly come from the database of CCER, China’s listed company database of GTA. For all 
samples, we carry out following criteria: (1) remove unavailable information, indeterminable ownership 
structure and incomplete financial data; (2) eliminate companies treated by ST, *ST and PT; (3) exclude 
companies of issuing both B and H shares; (4) exclude financial companies. Final sample consists of 10-
year balance Panel Data of 509 companies during 1999-2008, a total of 5,090 effective value. 
3. Empirical Test 
3.1. Promotion  Effect  Test 
      In order to compare results under the condition of different hypotheses, we use four estimation 
methods: OLS, FE, 2SLS and GMM. According to our knowledge, despite fixed effects model are widely 
used to deal with endogeneity problem in research, but it is a more conservative approach. In general, it 
can only eliminate endogenous impact caused by unobservable heterogeneity. If existing intertemporal 
effect, the method is inappropriate, because it will lead to a biased estimation, which has fully been 
demonstrated by Wintoki et al.(2010) in theory.  
Table 2  Promotion Effect Test of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance 
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ROA OLS FE 2SLS GMM 
MH 0.3693 -0.1824 -0.8948 -0.9035 
 ˄0.90˅ ˄-0.49˅ ˄-0.71˅ ˄-0.81˅    
CR1 0.0275*** 0.0423*** 0.2409** 0.0208 
 ˄6.45˅ ˄5.37˅ ˄2.31˅ ˄1.06˅ 
LNA 0.0093*** 0.0068*** 0.0261*** 0.0067**  
 ˄10.63˅ ˄4.15˅ ˄5.26˅ ˄2.40˅ 
DBR -0.1041*** -0.1449*** -0.1856*** -0.0550*** 
 ˄-19.28˅ ˄-21.74˅ ˄-10.79˅ ˄-3.75˅    
SE 0.0294** 0.0691*** 0.1114*** 0.1635**  
 ˄2.31˅ ˄7.04˅ ˄2.80˅ ˄2.41˅ 
TOP1 0.0069*** 0.0067** 0.0207*** 0.0092 
 ˄4.05˅ ˄2.39˅ ˄3.43˅ ˄1.20˅ 
RD -0.0459*** -0.0497*** -0.0278 -0.0518 
 ˄-3.98˅ ˄-2.96˅ ˄-1.24˅ ˄-1.36˅    
ROA(-1)    0.4400*** 
    ˄4.08˅ 
ROA(-2)    0.1539*** 
    ˄2.92˅ 
C -0.1283*** -0.0668*  -0.1523**  
 ˄-7.42˅ ˄-1.96˅  ˄-2.56˅    
R2 0.1424 0.1267 -0.0346              
Anderson LR   36.213***  
Sargan Test (P Value)   2.75(0.253)  
AR(1) Test (P Value     0.000  
AR(2) Test (P Value)    0.370 
Hansen Test    0.104 
Tests of Exogeneity       0.207 
 
Note: ***, **, *indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%(two-tail) test levels, respectively. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
As can be seen from Table 2, if not considering endogeneity problem, management ownership 
influences positively corporate performance. Otherwise, the sign of coefficient would be changed. 
According to these, we can judge that management ownership displays Managerial Entrenchment Effect, 
rather than Convergence-of-Interest Hypothesis. Morck et al. (1988) also point out only when the 
proportion of manager ownership is at a high level, there will be Managerial Entrenchment Effect. In 
addition, the linear impact of managerial ownership on performance is not statistically significant. But 
according to previous literatures, with increase of the proportion of management ownership, managerial 
ownership and corporate performance will take on an inverted "U" shaped relationship. Thus, it requires 
us to make further study. 
      For the proportion of largest shareholder, we find it significantly positively influences corporate 
performance in OLS, FE and 2SLS, which is different from U.S. listed companies discussed by Demsetz 
& Villalonga (2001). They believe, once considering endogeneity problem, corporate performance will 
have a significant impact on ownership structure, but not true in turn. This is because, in an imperfect 
market, there often exists the phenomenon of hostile takeovers, mergers and management buyouts. In 
order to adapt to the change, ownership structure needs adjusting. In this case, it will be a very difficult to 
predict empirical relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure. At the same time, 
some differences such as internal information and market anticipation will stimulate management and 
outside shareholders to adjust the proportion of equity holders by their future anticipation to corporate 
performance, so promotion effect is not obvious. For the subject, the empirical results of Greek listed 
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companies made by Drakos & Bekiris (2010) are consistent with our conclusions. However, we find 
although the direction of influence has not changed, the significance has gone and its coefficient 
decreases. In addition, two lags of performance are significant at 1% level, so there may be inherent 
relationship between prior performance and current proportion of largest shareholder.  
3.2. Feedback Effect Test 
     In Table 3, we list empirical results of feedback effect of corporate performance on ownership 
structure. According to the table, we can see performance and the proportion of largest shareholders both 
rise without considering endogeneity problem. On the contrary, the conclusion will change inversely. 
Similar evidence comes from empirical result of Demsetz & Villalonga(2001). This is because large 
shareholders may expect good performance closely follows bad performance; they usually scatter their 
risk through choosing the lower proportion of holdings. In addition, as outside shareholders, their primary 
goals are to obtain a best interest, which makes the choice of outside shareholders greatly distinguish 
from   management. When performance drops, if outside shareholders don’t reduce the proportion of 
holdings, they will suffer from losses. It also shows that even if we take into account the issue of 
endogeneity, the interaction between corporate performance and ownership structure still exists. Thus, the 
first hypothesis of the paper has been verified. In GMM regression, negative effect continues to emerge, 
but the coefficient is no longer significant. It is possible that the holding proportion of largest shareholder 
is affected by the prior. 
Table 3  Feedback Effect Test of Corporate Performance on Ownership Structure 
    CR1     MH   
 OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM 
ROA 0.3188*** -1.8747*** -0.0533 0.0004 0.0075 -0.0002 
 (6.16) (-3.29) (-0.65)    (0.69) (1.11) (-0.20)    
LNA 0.0283*** 0.0167 0.0078**  0.0000  0.0001 0.0001 
 (10.60) (0.98) (2.22) (0.71) (0.32) (1.14) 
DBR -0.1563*** -0.3952*** -0.0359*   0.0000  0.0013 -0.0004 
 (-10.52) (-3.74) (-1.70)    (0.30) (0.88) (-0.84)    
GROWTH 0.0171*** 0.0280*** 0.0149 0.0000  -0.0001* -0.0002 
 (4.98) (3.04) (1.36) (-1.51) (-1.75) (-1.15)    
SE -0.4040*** -0.3264*** 0.3121*** 0.0005 0.0006 0.0001 
 (-10.72) (-7.60) (3.31) (1.04) (1.21) (0.04) 
TOP1 -0.1066*** 0.0164 0.0083 0.0002** -0.0004*** 0.0000  
 (-20.62) (1.04) (1.40) (2.56) (-2.68) (0.35) 
CR(-1)   0.9312***    
   (10.77)    
CR(-2)   -0.0157    
   (-0.20)       
MH(-1)      0.7164*** 
      (3.20) 
MH(-2)      0.0202 
      (0.73) 
C -0.055  -0.1834**  -0.0002  -0.0015 
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 (-1.01)  (-2.45) (-0.25)  (-1.06)    
R2 0.161 -0.7104  0.001 -0.0329  
Anderson LR  14.08***   14.08***  
Sargan Test (P Value)  0.017(0.8969)   2.379(0.123)  
AR(1)Test (P Value)    0.000    0.015 
AR(2)Test (P Value)   0.324   0.747 
Hansen Test   0.201    0.155 
Tests of Exogeneity     0.309     0.197 
 
For corporate performance, we find it is no significant associations with managerial ownership in all 
cases, which is consistent with the conclusions of Omran & Fatheldin (2008), but different from empirical 
results of Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), Drakos & Bekiris (2010). According to their views, the two 
either significantly interact or unilaterally affect. Why does this happen? Through literature review, we 
affirm there are two possibilities: one is relevant to the choice of sample, which can be used to explain the 
differences of our findings from Chinese previous literature. For example, Huang Zhijun(2006) choose 
the data of China's listed companies between 2001-2003. During the period, the proportion of 
management ownership significantly decreases until around 2005. Our sample spans from 1999 to 2008, 
the proportion of management ownership appears a "V" type during that period. In this case, even if 
management ownership links with performance, the association may disappear due to the trend which is 
down then up to. In addition, equity incentive system of China’s listed companies has not been fully 
established. Subtle change of ownership can’t generate effective incentives to management, so poor or 
good performance seems irrelevant to the level of managerial ownership. The second possibility is that 
corporate performance and management ownership are both affected by a number of observable and 
unobservable exogenous factors surrounded by contract environment, which results in mutual 
independence of the two. In this case, even though we take into account intertemporal interaction of 
management ownership and use FE and GMM model to control, the result still shows the two are 
irrelevant. 
3.3. Robust Test 
According to empirical data of the above tables, we can see all regression results reject Aderson LR 
test, but accept the conclusions of Sargan Test, which indicate instrumental variables are reasonable in 
2SLS. In addition, in dynamic panel GMM estimation, it also shows we can accept the original hypothesis 
of Hansen over-identification at 10% significant level. At the same time, Difference-in-Hansen Tests of 
exogeneity indicate differential instrumental variables of system equations are legitimate. It makes us 
clear that instrumental variables meet the demands of exogenous strength in GMM estimation once again. 
4. Conclusions  
More and more literatures indicate there exists a dynamic interaction besides endogeneity between 
corporate performance and ownership structure. In this paper, we re-verify the hypotheses with Chinese 
data and obtain the following conclusions: 
Firstly, there is a two-way interaction effect between proportion of largest shareholding and corporate 
performance. Specifically, the former has a significant promotion effect on the latter. At the same time, 
the latter also has a strong feedback effect on the former. However, once considering the dynamic nature 
of performance, the significant relationship disappears, which indicates prior governance mechanism 
possibly influences current period mechanism. 
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Secondly, whether in a static or dynamic model, management ownership is uncorrelated with 
performance. One explanation is that they are affected by external unobserved heterogeneity. It is more 
likely that the percentage of management ownership of China's listed companies is extremely small. Thus, 
equity incentive system can't effectively be built up.  
Thirdly, we find out the weak evidence of intertemporal effect between ownership structure and 
corporate performance. However, the relationship is not stable. It is subject to the definition of 
performance variables and the choice of estimation methods. 
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